Britain and the euro
A key objective of the creation of the euro was to regain some of the economic stability that was a feature of the golden years of post-war growth. One of the reasons why the euro creates that stability is precisely because it insulates its members from the vagaries of the foreign exchange markets (Huhne and Forder 1999) . The overshooting of currency values upwards and downwards has been the most consistent feature of floating exchange rates (such as sterling's rate) since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed rates in 1971. Such overshooting on the upside causes output, investment and job cuts in trading industries as we discovered in 1980-81, and have discovered again in 1998-2000. Yet upwards overshooting is usually succeeded by an equal and opposite undershooting with potentially inflationary consequences as import prices rise. These episodes of overshooting appear to be an inherent part of the foreign exchange market, as they are of other financial markets. They cannot be avoided merely by means of better domestic policies. Yet they create instability, raise risks, undermine investment and reduce prosperity.
The European countries have always been too small economically -and hence too interdependent -to ignore these realities (in contrast to the continent-sized and largely self-sufficient US). In most of Europe's modern economic history, with the brief and disastrous exception of the 1930s, European countries have been linked by some fixed exchange rate system (for example, Bretton Woods, European Monetary System) or by a quasi-monetary union (for example, the Gold Standard, particularly from 1880 to 1914). In a world of increasing capital flows, we can expect floating exchange rates to become even more volatile. Equally, the half-way house of fixed but adjustable exchange rates is no longer sustainable. The euro is a modern response to an age-old policy problem, enabling monetary stability in a world of massive speculative capital flows. It is a way of regaining control over our economic environment, and of exercising some real monetary sovereignty.
The macro-economics of the euro are clear. But the issue of British euro membership is also increasingly urgent for micro-economic reasons. The longer we are out, the greater the risk that our big businesses will essentially just become Euro-based, regarding their UK operations as a side-show. And our medium-sized and small businesses will not participate in the new wave of competition that is flowing from the creation of the euro.
Price differences are gradually being eliminated by many multinationals in anticipation of the changeover to physical euro notes and coins in the first half of 2002. This is creating a much more competitive environment. In turn, businesses are investing and consolidating to create the economies of scale that will allow them to survive in the new pan-European market. The scope for consolidation is vast: Europe's segmented markets still have seven car makers against three in the United States, ten makers of turbines against two in the US, and so on. As the euro creates a genuine single market, the value
